In this paper, we analyze and propose a solution for the challenges that come with personalized genomic and, most importantly, of performing queries on sequenced dataset sitting on a cloud server. This work provides scenarios for its application in personalized genomic medicine, and tests homomorphic encryption technique to assist in improving the strength of their privacy at non-prohibitive performance cost. By experimental testing using HElib, we make a first step towards performing practical computation over the relevant portions of the genomic dataset of an individual for a first round of practical diagnosis rules.
INTRODUCTION
Physicians and researchers think that understanding how genes influence disease will require genetic and health datasets to be collected from millions of people. Such a massive task will probably require harnessing the processing power of networked cloud computers, but online security breaches in the past few years illustrate the dangers of entrusting huge, sensitive datasets to the cloud. Genomic dataset analysis is increasingly incorporated in a variety of domains, including personalized medicine, biomedical research, direct-to-consumer services, and forensics.
Genome sequencing technology has advanced at a rapid pace and it is now possible to generate highly-detailed genotypes inexpensively. As a result, genome sequencing may soon become a routine tool for clinical diagnosis and therapy selection. In the (near) future, personalized medicine will result in "right drug at the right time" according to their patients' genome dataset.
The implementation of genomic-based medicine is the challenge of transmitting clinically useful information to health-care practitioners. In this study, we choose personalized medicine case scenario as a model setting for an implementation of privacypreserving genetic testing and results reporting.
Genomic Dataset Privacy Issues.
The whole genome sequencing was initiated at the U.S. National
Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1990 and the first full sequence was released years later at a total cost of $3 billion. Yet, sequencing technology has evolved and costs have plummeted, such that the price for a whole genome sequence is $5K as of July 2014 and can be completed in two to three days. The "$1K genome in 1 day" will soon be a reality (Naveed et al., 2015) . As the cost of sequencing the human genome drops, more and more genomic dataset will become available for research and study. At the same time, researchers are developing new methods for analyzing genomic dataset across populations to look for patterns and find correlations. Such research may help identify genetic risk factors for diseases, suggest treatments, or find cures. To make this dataset available for scientific study, patients expose themselves to risks from invasion of privacy (Ayday et al., 2013a) . Decreases in sequencing costs have coincided with an escalation in genomics as a research discipline with explicit application possibilities.
Personalized Medicine.
Personalized medicine promises to revolutionize healthcare through treatments tailored to an individual's genomic makeup and genome-based disease risk tests that can enable early diagnosis of serious diseases such as diagnosis of suspected mendelian conditions and for targeting cancer treatments. The current rise of personalized medicine is based on increasing affordability and availability of As mentioned in Subsection 1, the cost to sequence an entire human genome continues to fall, the potential exists for rapid advances in wellness and health care resulting from this new technology. Essential to achieving those advances is the need to outsource, compare, and aggregates the genome dataset. However, as the ease with which the acquisition and outsourcing of genome sequencing information increases, so we will have questions and concerns about privacy, security, and efficiency.
Contributions of this Paper
In this paper, we propose an architecture and its application in personalized medicine case scenario. We test homomorphic encryption techniques to assist in improving the strength of their privacy at non-prohibitive performance cost. We experimentally analyse our personalized medicine case scenario architecture using the HElib library, and HElib achieves near practical computation cost. We show that the proposed solution have used real genomic rules, which have been generated by the geneticists in our team (authors 2 and 3). Our main contributions are (i) to keep genomic datasets secure while still enabling cloud-based analyses needed to make meaningful diagnosis, (ii) provide acceptable level of privacy requirements in each step of handling of genomic datasets, collecting, analyzing, storing or sharing the genetic informations and (iii) provide a characterization of various threat models that are addressed at each step.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the current literature relative to the challenges mentioned in Section 1. Section 3 provides an architecture, including descriptions of various main components. Section 4 gives a detailed description of homomorphic encryption method used in our methodology. Section 5 presents an insider threat model for our architecture. Section 6 demonstrates the experimental results, and indicates homomorphic encryption overhead is not prohibitive for this application. Section 7 summarizes and presents conclusions.
THE CURRENT SOLUTIONS
Privacy issues caused by forensic, medical and other uses of genomic dataset have been studied in the past few years (Jiang et al., 2014) , and (Naveed et al., 2015) . Homomorphic encryption technique is quickly becoming more relevant due to its great potential for privacy computation on encrypted genomic datasets. This technique has a number of other advantages, allowing for more flexible case scenarios, and requiring less interaction, thereby reducing the communication complexity. The cryptographic overhead consists of the time to perform operations for each gate of the circuit as well as other maintenance operations. Unfortunately, it is hard to characterize simply the cryptographic overhead of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) because there are a lot of parameters that affect its performance, such as the multiplicative depth, the security parameter, the plaintext size, the exact FHE scheme used, the performance of various operations in the finite fields used. Lepoint and Naehrig (Lepoint and Naehrig, 2014) and Halevi (Halevi, 2013) provide performance measurements for various settings of these parameters. A number of key optimizations and batch techniques (Halevi and Shoup, 2014) , (Zhou and Wornell, 2014) have been introduced to reduce overall computation complexity and increase efficiency of these homomorphic based schemes. Recently, homomorphic encryption techniques (Ayday et al., 2014) , (Ayday et al., 2013b) , (Lauter et al., 2015) have been used to encrypt genomic datasets in such a way that storage can be outsourced to an untrusted cloud, and the datasets can be computed on in a meaningful way in encrypted form, without requiring access to decryption keys. These protocols have some drawbacks such as being computationally intensive, leaking more than necessary and being unscalable; mainly due to the very large size of genomic datasets. However, a number of optimization techniques (Halevi and Shoup, 2014) , (Zhou and Wornell, 2014) have been presented to overcome the limitations of using homomorphic based solutions. Building practical systems that compute on encrypted genomic datasets are a challenging task. One reason is that homomorphic encryption method remains too slow for running arbitrary functions or for enabling the complex systems we have today. Another reason is that many systems take advantage of fast search data structures (such as database indexes), and a practical system must preserve this performance over encrypted dataset.
We present a cryptographic solution for genomic datasets storage and outsourcing, and maintaining patient privacy. All encrypted genomic datasets are stored in an untrusted cloud server. To allow meaningful computation on the encrypted genomic datasets, we use HElib (Halevi, 2013) , (Halevi and Shoup, 2014) . Specially, we take basic genomic algorithms which are commonly used in genetic association studies and show how they can be made to work on encrypted genotype and phenotype datasets. We also tackled the insider attack situation in an untrusted cloud server where the attacker is assumed to have access to the content of the disk as well as the CPU and the memory.
OUR ARCHITECTURE
The system architecture is designed for enhanced privacy protection of encrypted genomic datasets downloaded to a medical organization/doctor from the cloud server, such as in the case of personalized medicine. The proposed system (Figure 1 ) involves five components: (i) the patients; (ii) Healthcare Providers (HPs) have patients' biological samples; (iii) a Sequencing Facility (SF) responsible for sequencing, management of cryptographic keys, and encryption of patients' sequenced genomic datasets; (iv) a Cloud Server (CS) where the encrypted form of "sequenced genomic datasets" (EGDS) are stored, and all computations and communications held on; and (v) Medical Organizations (MOs), or doctors, wishing to perform genetic tests on the patients' genomic datasets. Our full architecture includes several patients, several HPs, and several MOs/doctors, all accessing the one server. The CS has a component which we refer to as Service Manager (SM), which is responsible for dataset storage in the CS, performs computation on requested query to get the result, and sends query result to the MO/doctor. To simplify the explanations, in the system model here we present only one patient, one HP, one MO/doctor, as shown in Figure 1 . In our architecture, MO/doctor is a part of the HP. The MO/doctor has the secret key to decrypt EGDS and get the sequenced EGDS for further analysis and research. Patient can also have secret key to get the EGDS from the CS. To secure the communication, the participants (patient, a HP, and the MO/doctor) are authenticated, and the connection is protected using authorization process and risk management policies. We deploy access control policies at the CS. The CS performs access control by making decision requests and enforcing access control decisions using Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs) (Q. Yaseen et al., 2013) . The system entities that evaluate the applicable policies and make an access control decision are referred to as Policy Decision Points (PDPs) (Q. Yaseen et al., 2013) .
In the following sections, we describe in detail the components of our architecture. We can classify five components of our architecture into three modules. These three modules are data contributor, cloud server, and data requester. Data contributor has three components; a patient, a HP, and a SF. Data requester is a MO or doctor. Our architecture is depicted in Figure 1, which shows an interaction between a patient, a HP, SF, a MO/doctor, and a CS.
Data Contributor Module
The data contributor module has three components: a patient, a HP, and a SF. Patient. Each patient has history of medical records and biological samples to the HP, which is containing sensitive data such as blood samples. Patient has the secret key to see the content of his EGDS, which is stored on the CS. Healthcare Provider (HP). The HP is responsible for good medical treatment of each patient. The HP sends biological samples such as blood sample to the SF, in order to sequence genome datasets for better medical treatment. Sequencing Facility (SF). The main component on the data contributor is the SF. Now, the SF has biological samples, which is received from the HP for sequencing analysis. We note that the SF currently would have access to unprotected raw genetic variants and therefore must be a trusted entity. The SF is responsible for genome sequencing received from the HP, encrypting genome datasets using strong symmetric data encryption, and sending encrypted form of sequenced genomic datasets (SGDS) to the CS for dataset storage. In addition, we are assuming a model where the encrypted SGDS are stored in a centralized untrusted CS rather than at the HP, which maximizes efficiency and security. To maintain privacy of SGDS on the CS with no storage overhead, transciphering techniques (Canteaut et al., 2016) have to be used to translate these datasets into the homomorphic Towards Confidentiality-strengthened Personalized Genomic Medicine Embedding Homomorphic Cryptography domain, where they can be processed with respect to the public key of a given MO/doctor (that way, FHE overhead is paid only transiently in the server memory during the homomorphic calculation). In this scheme, each individual ciphertext element is conceptually a vector of encrypted plaintext integrals. This construction gave rise to a SIMD style operations that could particularly be effective with problems that benefit from some level of parallel computation.
Cloud Server Module
Cloud computing provides massive computation power and storage capacity which enables a user to deploy applications without infrastructure investment (Zhang et al., 2013) . We do not deal with the CS's internal working here (See Figure 1) . The service manager (SM) is a function of the CS which handles each send/receive process on a CS. The SM accepts EGDS from the SF and stores in the data repository. The SM privately processes queries, gives 'private' feedback to MO or doctor, and maintains the credential revocation. At the CS, we also use access control mechanisms to provide additional layer of security for insider threat. Risk Assessment. Insiders use many approaches and factors to launch attacks. Two of the most risky factors that can be used are insiders' knowledgebase and dependencies among datasets. Modern access control mechanisms use the request-response paradigm. This model consists of the Policy Decision Point (PDP) (Q. Yaseen et al., 2013) , which is responsible of issuing accessing decisions, and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) (Q. Yaseen et al., 2013) , which is responsible of enforcing these decisions. We adopted these control policies in our architecture. Adding policies will increase cost in our architecture. So, we need a solution to this problem should take into account the trade off between preventing insider threat and performance.
The SM is responsible for each send and receive process on the CS by means of the traditional requestresponse paradigm, in which policies are established and decisions are made on the basis of these policies. In recent papers encouraging the development of a standard approach to risk management in cloud services and grids. The European Grid Infrastructure (EGI) design as appearing at (https://www.egi.eu/), now establishes a standard for risk evaluation and mitigation. Figure 4 of the paper (Nogoorani and Jalili, 2016) illustrates an architecture providing risk prevention by means of a separation of policy decision from enforcement, along with a thorough evaluation of trust and risk. We do not require the extensive risk assessment of the EGI, but do follow its recommendations by separating PEP from PDP and by introducing a risk manager at the PDP side in our architecture for preventing insider threat in PEP-side caching model while keeping a low overhead on PEP and PDP performance.
Data Requester Module
The component of the data requester includes decryption process of BGV method (see in Section 4) to get requested data. The MO/doctor requests data query to access EGDS from the CS, the CS sends requested data in encrypted form. The MO/doctor has secret key to decrypt data using "Decryption steps" from BGV method and get the requested data. Data queries of medical significance only exploit a small portion of genome data (typically a few tens of positions combined in a boolean expression). Hence, as long as the storage overhead issue is solved using transciphering techniques the practical processing of phenotype determination queries in an encrypted domain appears achievable (or almost so) using present day homomorphic encryption techniques.
THE BGV SCHEME
The Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme (Brakerski et al., 2012) stands today as one of the most efficient somewhat FHE scheme. The implementation of this scheme has been discussed in the literature (Brakerski et al., 2012) , which is focused on the evaluation of AES (Gentry et al., 2010) . In our setup, it involves encrypting genomic datasets on a SF, then uploading EGDS to the CS. Computations on EGDS are performed in the CS and an encrypted result is then sent back to a MO/doctor as requested data from the CS. The MO/doctor decrypts an answer using secret key. If attackers were to intercept EGDS at any point along the way, the underlying data would remain safe. We use HElib software library for our experimental analysis and results (see in Subsection 6.2), which implements the BGV scheme, along with many optimizations to make homomorphic evaluation runs faster.
Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan
(BGV) Scheme. This section provides a basic description of BGV scheme. Notation Descriptions. Let us denote by [.] q the reduction modulo q into the interval (−q 2; q 2] ∩ Z of the integer or integer polynomial (coefficientwise). For a security parameter λ, we choose an integer m = m(λ) that defines the m-th cyclotomic polynomial φ m (x). For a polynomial ring R = Z[x] (φ m (x)), set the plaintext space to R t := R tR) for some fixed t ≥ 2 and the ciphertext space to R q := R qR for an integer q = q(λ). Let X = X(λ) denotes a noise distribution over the ring R. We use the standard notation a ← D to denote that a is chosen from the distribution D. Now, we recall the BGV scheme (Brakerski et al., 2012) . Gentry, Halevi and Smart (Gentry et al., 2010) constructed an efficient BGV scheme. The security of this scheme is based on the (decisional) Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) assumption. The assumption is that it is infeasible to distinguish the following two distributions. The first distribution consists of pairs (a i , u i ), where a i , u i ←− R q uniformly at random. The second distribution consists of pairs of the form (a i , b i ) = (a i , a i s + e i ) where a i ←− R q drawn uniformly and s, e i ←− X. Note that we can generate RLWE samples as (a i , a i s + te i ) where t and q are relatively prime. To improve efficiency for HE, they use very sparse secret keys s with coefficients sampled from {−1, 0, 1}. Here is the SHE scheme of (Brakerski et al., 2012) :
ParamsGen: Given the security parameter λ, choose an odd integer m, a chain of moduli q 0 < q 1 < ........ < q L−1 = q, a plaintext modulus t with 1 < t < q 0 , and discrete Gaussian distribution X err . Output (m, {q i },t, X err ).
KeyGen: On the input parameters, choose a random s from {0, ±1} φ(m) and generate an RLWE instance (a, b) = (a, [as + te] q ) for e ← X err . For an integer P, we define the key switching matrix W = for a s ← R q uniformly at random and e s ← X err . We set the key pair:(pk, sk, evk) = ((a, b), s,W ). Then we define the SwitchKey(c, evk) for the extended ci-
and then take an element c ∈ R ql such that c ≡ c (modt) and c is the closet to P.c modulo t.
Encryption: To encrypt m ∈ R t , choose a small polynomial v and two Gaussian polynomials e 0 , e 1 over R q . Then compute the ciphertext given by 
and the key switching function SwitchKey is used to reduce the size of ciphertexts to two ring elements. We also apply modulus switching from q i to q i−1 in order to reduce the noise. If we reach the smallest modulus q 0 , we can no longer compute on ciphertexts. BGV scheme adapted the Smart and Vercauteren scheme (Smart and Vercauteren, 2014) for optimization.
INSIDER THREAT MODEL
This section addresses that we prevent the CS from launching the insider attacks. In our architecture, the SM manages and stores EGDS from the SF. These datasets may have dependencies that can be determined by an insider. In addition insiders can retrieve general knowledge about the types of datasets being stored. Use of such dependencies among datasets and the knowledgebase of insiders (Nogoorani and Jalili, 2016) , (Q. Yaseen et al., 2013) may enable the insider to infer sensitive information. We choose the following criteria for the establishment of protection against insider attacks:
1. To prevent the SM from reading plaintext genomic datasets. As presented in Subsection 3.2, the SF employs computationally strong homomorphic encryption that makes the possibility of an exposure negligible even if insiders get access to the encrypted datasets. To prevent any kind of information leakage, we use the whole datasets are encrypted. The SM performs all computation on the EGDS. Since the original dataset always remains encrypted on the CS, there is no direct way in which the insider can access this data unless he is able to break the encryption method. With the privacy model and the analysis of attacks, we find that our EGDS is strongly secure from the insiders.
2. We did not present the query processing steps between the CS and the MO/doctor in detail in this paper. However, based on the formal model for security of BGV scheme provides privacy of the MO/doctor as long as the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme is secure.
3. Prevention of abuse of PEP-side caching in Sub-subsection 3.2, we describe the risks involved because of the standard caching methods used in the CS. This can be resolved by a separation of the PDP from the PEP as described in (Q. Yaseen et al., 2013) , along Towards Confidentiality-strengthened Personalized Genomic Medicine Embedding Homomorphic Cryptography with introduction of an insider threat detection unit at the PDP side is used in our scheme to prevent PEPside caching; we have implemented this in our architecture. The authors of (Nogoorani and Jalili, 2016) also use this separation to prevent this insider attack (see their Figure 4 ).
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents the computation cost analysis of genomic datasets encryption, computation and decryption time. Our objective is to prove that the computation cost of homomorphic encryption scheme is close to be practical. We explain how to set the parameters for homomorphic evaluations and present our experimental results. We use HElib software library that implements BGV scheme. HELib is written in C++ and based on the arithmetic library NTL (http://www.shoup.net/ntl/) over GMP (https://gmplib.org/).
HElib Library. Due to use of BGV system we can evaluate many such instances in parallel using batching. We further use additional optimization including a systematic use tree-structured multiplications to achieve very low multiplicative depth on the specific kind of algorithms involved in our study.
Datasets and ABO Rules
We utilize the public available dataset Blood Group Antigen Gene Mutation Database (BGMUT), which is an online repository of allelic variations in genes that determine the antigens of various human blood group systems. Currently, the database documents sequence variations of a total of 1251 alleles of all 40 gene that together are known to affect antigens of 30 human blood group systems. BGMUT is a part of the dbRBC resource of the National Center for Biotechnology Information, and is available at (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gv/mhc/xslcg i.cgi?cmd=bgmut/home).
We develop two ABO rules using BGMUT datasets. We run our HElib-based prototype on these datasets and evaluate our ABO rules to see the presence of ABO blood type for each patient. We have two ABO rules labeled as ABO-1, and ABO-2. The size of ABO-1 is 2.79 KB which is very small in comparison with ABO-2 size, which is 45.4 KB (approx. 23 pages in .doc extension, 11 pt "times new roman" size of content). A total of 2504 patients are included in this study. The size of each patient dataset is 17.7 KB, in total we have 44.3 MB datasets for the experimental analysis. Each dataset is defined in table format, which has six columns. The sample of each patient's dataset is defined in Table 1 . In first row of Table 1 , the "9" indicates chromosome, an integer number "136125819" that corresponds to the position at the reference chromosome, "C" which is the nucleotide at the reference chromosome, and "T" which indicates the nucleotides of the alternative allele. In the columns 5 and 6, both values are "0", which means that the both alleles of an individual have no change in the nucleotide compared to reference chromosome. Similarly, all the rows are defined. In second row, values are "0" and "1", which mean that one of the alleles has a polymorphism at that specific chromosome position. If we have both values are "1" means that both alleles have that specific polymorphism.
Experiment Setup and Results
This section presents the experimental results of ABO rules using HElib. Our experiments using HElib are performed on an Ubuntu 14.04 virtual box which is running on windows 7 with Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-5300U CPU, 2.30 GHz processor, and RAM 16 GB. We present performance costs in the terms of time and size. We carried out 20 runs for each experiment to obtain the average performance metric values.
HElib Parameter Settings
We present the HElib parameter setting for secure genomic datasets analysis in Table 3 . The HElib context is mainly defined by the plaintext base (p), the security parameter (λ) and the circuit depth (L). All the parameters provide 128-bit security level. In particular, L can be considered as the number of ciphertext moduli in the BGV scheme. We choose the following parameter values: p = 2 and λ = 128. The values of L are presented for evaluation of both rules in Table  3 . The security of BGV relies on the hardness of the RLWE assumption (Brakerski et al., 2012 ).
Experimental Results
We measure the running time of key generation, encryption, evaluation, and decryption to evaluate the overall performance as well as the impact of the HElib in our considered genome datasets. This segment presents the experimental results of both rules, which are shown in Tables 3, and 4 respectively. In our datasets, each of genome sequence is expressed in a binary representation.
ABO-1 Rule:
We implement and analyze the computation cost of running ABO-1 rule on genomic datasets. Our ABO-1 rule is presented in Table 2 . In ABO-1, first column indicates the blood group type and the second column indicates the conditions that are required to have that specific blood group type. We define 15 rules (O1O1, A2O1, A2A2, B1O1, B1B1, A2B1, A1O1, O1O3, A1A1, A1O3, O3O3, A1B1, B1O3, A1A2, A2O3), which are presented in Table 2 . For example, in order to have the blood group type O1O1, the individual should not have an polymorphism at chromosome 9 at position 136132908; indicated by the factor (9:136132908;T;TC;0|0). In Table 2 , "9" indicates chromosome, followed by a separator ":" and an integer number "136131316" that corresponds to the position at the reference chromosome. The ";" is separator followed by "T" which is the nucleotide at the reference chromosome, followed by a separator ";" and then the value "T" which indicates the nucleotides of the alternative allele. The difference between the reference chromosome and the sample chromosome: the sample/individual contains an additional nucleotide "C" with respect to the reference. In case it is written ";G;A;" it means that in the individual the nucleotide G has been changed into the nucleotide A with respect to the reference chromosome. Another separator ";" followed by the genotype (GT) annotation. 0|0 means that both alleles of an individual have no change in the nucleotide compared to reference chromosome. 0|1 means that one of the alleles has a polymorphism at that specific chromosome position. 1|1 means that both alleles have that specific polymorphism and thus the individual is homozygote for that polymorphism.
ABO-2 Rule: This segment describes the ABO-2 rule. This rule contains many sections to determine haplotype and phenotype (A, B, AB and O). One section contains simple rules that can determine phenotype but this prediction is not 100% accurate as it leaves out certain very rare alleles. The other section contains more complicated rules that take all (known) alleles into account and this should be more accurate.
The size of ABO-2 rule is presented in Subsection 6.1, as the size of ABO-2 is quite large, which is not possible to present in this paper. We develop ABO-2 rule for determining these blood groups for each patient such as: O haplotype, B haplotype, T haplotype. Additionally, we develop extended rules to decrease (false negative) FN and (false positive) FP for these rules O haplotype, B haplotype, and T haplotype. We introduce simple rules for determining phenotypes such as O phenotype, T phenotype (T phenotype w/ TT genotype, T phenotype w/TO genotype), B phenotype (B phenotype w/BB genotype, B phenotype w/BO genotype, TB phenotype). At the last, we develop some extended rules for determining phenotype rules with genotype including B phenotype rules for genotype, T phenotype rules for genotype, and TB phenotype w, corresponding rules for genotype.
We implement these ABO-1, and ABO-2 rules using HElib to identify the presence of ABO blood types in patient's blood for further analysis and better treatment. The results are shown in Tables 3, and 4 respectively. Table 3 describes the parameters which have been used in Table 4 for our experimental analysis.
We use default value of plaintext base (p) which is 2. The value of circuit depth (L) depends on the number of multiplications in ABO-1, and ABO-2 rules. We use tree-structured multiplications to achieve low multiplicative depth in evaluation of ABO-1, and ABO-2 rules.
Tables 3, and 4 present one patient dataset analysis. We can run these experiments using paralleliza- tion method and calculate average value of all patients' results, and get the same performance results, which are presented in both Tables 3, and 4 respectively. Table 3 also presents size of original dataset, ciphertext dataset, public key, and private key. Discussion of choosing value of "L" is presented in Subsection 6.2.3. Table 4 presents the sequential computation costs of ABO-1, and ABO-2 running on genomic datasets. We calculate computation cost by measuring CPU timing during key generation, encryption, ABO rule evaluation, and decryption in seconds, and put total execution time in last column of Table 4 . In "Decryption (D)" column, "1" denotes presence of blood group type and "0" denotes blood group type is not present. These analysis are performed for all 2504 patients. We have performed all the test in 20 times and take average value.
Multiplicative Depth "L"
HElib parameter "L" is considered to find the multiplicative depth in ABO computations. We use function "multiplyBy()" for multiplication in both ABO rules because "multiplyBy()" is equivalent to " * =" followed by a relinearization (Halevi and Shoup, 2013) . Relinearization allows us to perform multiple multiplications efficiently. The relinearization operation ensures that all ciphertext parts handle the point to either the constant 1 or a base secretkey (Halevi and Shoup, 2013 ). In HElib library, authors have defined a higher-level method "void Ctxt::multiplyBy(const Ctxt& other)". This method multiplies two ciphertexts, it begins by removing primes from the two arguments down to a level where the rounding-error from modulus-switching is the dominating noise term, then it calls the low-level routine to compute the tensor product, and finally it calls the relinearize method to get back a canonical ciphertext. To see the level of resulting ciphertexts using "findBaseLevel()" from HElib library (Halevi, 2013) . Afterwards we decrease initial L parameter by "findBaseLevel()-1". In this way resulting ciphertexts level with new L parameter will be 1 and decryption will work. The following equation describes the lattice dimension n that is necessary to evaluate deep-L circuits correctly with guarantee of k-bits security, n > (L(log n + 23) − 8.5)(k + 110) 7.2
In ABO-1 rule, the number of multiplication is 7. So, we need level atleast 2 3 = 8 that is L = 3. If we take L = 3, the base level will be 3-1 = 2 (Halevi, 2013) , which is a low depth level for 7 number of multiplication. If we take L = 4 (non prime number) then HElib library automatically uses level 3, and gets base level 2 again. So, we use L = 5, and get base level 4. For ABO-1, the value of L is L ≥ 5. Similarly, the value of L for ABO-2 is L ≥ 15.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design an entire secure framework for genomic datasets processing leveraging on pub-lic cloud. The model protects not only genomic sequences but also the intermediate and final computation results when processing on public cloud. We evaluate our proposed framework through intensive experiments using real genomic datasets. This study assessed the steps required for deployment of privacypreserving genetic testing in personalized medicine scenario. We test the applicability of homomorphic encryption techniques for genetic testing with ABO rules. This includes protection of the genomic datasets itself and the possibility to conduct various operations such as ABO analysis within an encrypted environment. The testing results have proven that HElib performance is close to be practical in genomic datasets evaluation. Our next step is to enable transciphering (Canteaut et al., 2016) within our architecture in order to enhance the storage efficiency of the genomic datasets.
